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Settler Colonialism and 
Conflict: The Israeli State and 
its Palestinian Subjects 
 
MAGID SHIHADE 
Birzeit University 
 
In this article I discuss the relationship between Israeli settler 
colonialism, group identities, conflict, and violence. The paper focuses 
on ‘1948 Palestinians’, and the relationship between them and the 
state. I explore the relationship between settler colonialism and 
communal identity through a case study of an incident of communal 
violence that erupted in Galilee in 1981 between two different religious 
groups within the Palestinian Arab community. I investigate the different 
narratives that emerged to explain and frame the incident. I trace this 
event to a larger structure rooted in the history of settler colonialism in 
Palestine, thus shifting attention away from culturalist explanations of 
‘Arab violence’. In addition to the case in Kafr Yassif, I will briefly discuss 
other cases to illustrate the pattern in which the Israeli settler colonial 
state’s policies are tied to issues of identity, conflict, and violence within 
the native Palestinian community. The essay also addresses the 
importance of this framework to Palestine Studies.  
 
 
This article focuses on the question of settler colonialism in relation 
to ‘1948 Palestinians’ – Palestinians who managed to stay on their 
lands after the 1948 War and became Israeli ‘citizens’. The 
Palestine/Israel issue is better understood, in my view, by grappling 
with the predicament of these Palestinians as a settler-colonial 
condition, and by studying the origins of the Israeli state and its 
historical development in order to understand how it deals with its 
colonised subjects. My discussion will focus on communal identity 
and conflict among 1948 Palestinians through a theoretical analysis 
of Israeli settler colonialism, and its impact on communal relations 
and conflict, and through a discussion of how, despite Israeli claims 
and rhetoric regarding the ‘rule of law’, ‘democracy’, and 
‘modernity’, Israeli policies have led to conflicts and violence within 
the Arab Palestinian native community. 
In other words, I argue that the question of communal/group 
identity, conflict and violence among Palestinians in Israel is better 
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understood with reference to the ways in which religion was exploited 
to further the settler colonial project. Although the paper will focus 
on 1948 Palestinians, I will briefly refer to one similar case from the 
1967 territories to highlight the way in which the Israeli state works 
to advance intercommunal conflicts. The case from Kafr Yassif is 
based on more than three years of fieldwork (2002-2005), interviews 
of eye witnesses, archival work in the village, and Israeli official 
reports on the incident. The other cases are based on media reports 
and on brief interviews with local witnesses and community leaders. 
The article will first discuss briefly the different religious 
communities in Palestine and their relationship to the Israeli state. In 
the second part, I will discuss the test cases. 
 
THE RACIALISATION OF RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES: MUSLIMS, 
CHRISTIANS AND JEWS 
 
By end of WWI, Britain occupied Palestine, which had until then been 
part of the Ottoman Empire. It established what became known as 
the British Mandate in Palestine, facilitating over the course of two 
decades the economic, social, and political infrastructures for the 
establishment of the future settler colonial Israeli state, while 
repressing the economic, political, and social structure of the 
Palestinian native society.1 The war on Palestine and the creation of 
the Israeli settler colonial state in 1948 led to the displacement and 
dispossession of the Palestinian native society and to the destruction 
of Palestinian cities and villages.2  
From close to one million Palestinians only around 150,000 
remained in the newly created state. From 500 villages, only 100 
remained undestroyed by the Zionist Israeli troops, and all major 
cities were emptied of most of their Palestinian residents. Those that 
remained became minority enclaves in the Jewish dominated 
environment.3 Due to the Israeli and previous British colonial policies 
of imprisonment, deportation, and targeted killing of leaders, 
because of the challenge the leaders posed to the British-Zionist 
settler colonial project, the Palestinians who managed to remain on 
their lands found themselves almost leaderless. The remnants of the 
Palestinian society thus found themselves a minority in a state that 
was built on their own lands, and became citizens in a state that by 
its ideology and policies was and continues to be anti-Arab and anti-
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Palestinian, that looks at them with contempt, as a threat, as a 
demographic ‘time-bomb’, and as an obstacle to Jewish rein state. 
 Although the idea of transfering those who managed to remain 
was and continues to be contemplated by Zionist and Israeli Jewish 
leaders, till this moment no such step was taken. This is due to 
several reasons. One is the rise of decolonisation movements 
worldwide since the mid-twentieth century. Another is the 
advancement of communication that could expose such actions 
much faster than previous genocides and ethnic cleansings 
performed by other settler colonial projects. Yet another is due to the 
fact that Israel heavily relies on Western support and works hard to 
make itself globally acceptable as a normal state. Such an action 
would harm such support and tarnish the Israeli self-presented 
image as a ‘democratic peace loving state’, and a state that respects 
Western modernity’s mantra – ‘the rule of law’.4 Instead, Israel 
designed several policies and strategies aimed at repressing, 
marginalising and dispossessing its Palestinian citizens on the basis 
of national identity and religious affiliations.5 
 
JEW AND PALESTINIAN 
 
With the establishment of the Israeli setter colonial state, the policy 
regarding ethnicity, national identity, and religious affiliation became 
crucial. It continues to be so to this day. By defining itself as a state 
for the Jewish people, or a Jewish state, Israelis turned the Jewish 
religion into an official ethnic and national category. The fact that 
Judaism has been a religion for millennia, or that Jews have lived as 
a religious community among different societies, including the Arab 
and Palestinian societies, did not matter. This rupture in the history 
of Jews and Judaism was paralleled by the policy of turning the 
Palestinians who remained in the Israeli state into members of 
various religious communities lacking national identity. On the 
national identification cards, they were identified as a minority with 
one or another religious affiliation: Christian, Muslim, and Druze. The 
dominant terminology that was used and continues to be used to 
define them was that of ‘Israeli Arabs’. The aim was not only to 
divide and rule, but also to disconnect them from the larger 
Palestinian community and the Arab people at large.6 Internally, they 
are defined as a collection of religious sects; to the outside they are 
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branded as ‘Israeli Arabs’, so that they are disconnected from each 
other internally on a religious basis, and at the same time they 
remain disconnected from the Palestinian people and from the larger 
Arab identity. A policy of internal ghettoisation and of external 
disconnection defined the position of the Israeli state towards them 
from early on. 
While the Jews became categorised as such (religiously and 
ethnically-nationally), the Palestinians were defined as ‘Israeli Arabs’ 
– a category that makes them belong fully to neither. It also defined 
them according to their religious affiliations and created new ones. 
Thus, as of 1948, they turned from being Palestinians, to become 
Christians, Muslims, and Druze.7 
 
CHRISTIANS, MUSLIMS, AND DRUZE 
 
During the war of 1948 most Palestinians resisted the Zionist 
onslaught on their lands. They did so in a variety of ways. Some, as 
in most cases of colonial interventions, cooperated with the colonial 
power. Among those who cooperated were the Druzes, members of 
an Islamic religious sect who, as access to their lands and source of 
living was in the hands of Zionist troops, were forced to cooperate 
with the Israeli leaders. Once the military regime was imposed on 
this community in 1948, they could not leave their village without a 
permit from the local military governor. As Druzes worked primarily 
in farming, and as they needed to leave the village and go to work on 
the land, they fell under intense pressure. Collaborating allowed 
them to get permits and make a living. There were also those among 
the Druze leaders who took advantage of the new situation and 
helped in swaying the Druze community to the Israeli side. Soon 
after the creation of the state of Israel, they helped impose military 
conscription on the Druze community. This was the first major split 
between the Druze and the rest of the Palestinian community.8  
Not only did the Israeli state recognise the Druze as a religious 
community, in the 1950s it recognised them as an ethnic group. 
Their religious identity was thus ethnicised, politicised, and directed 
towards hostility against Arabs and Palestinians. While the Druze 
sect was only formed in the 10th century Fatimid Egypt, the myth of 
an ancient affinity between Druze and Jews, who both suffered under 
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the hands of Muslim Arab rule, became established in the Israeli 
official narrative. But myths are never enough to solidify identities; 
more measures were taken to further split Druze, Muslims, and 
Christians. In addition to the official definition of ‘the Druze’ as a 
separate community, first religious, and then ethnic, conscription in 
the Israeli military also helped creating and advance an anti-
Palestinian and anti-Arab identity. Furthermore, the Israeli state took 
several economic and educational measures to ensure the further 
separation of Druzes from the rest of the Arab Palestinian 
community.9 
 
EDUCATION, SEGREGATION, AND DIVIDE‐AND‐RULE POLICIES 
 
While the Israeli state created a separate educational system for 
Jews and for Palestinians, it also aimed to create a separate 
educational system for the Druze community. The separate 
educational system for the Druze community emphasised conflict 
with Palestinians and Arabs and affinity with Jews and Israel. The 
one developed for the rest of the Arab community emphasised the 
positive character of Jews and Israel to the detriment of Islam and 
Arabs.10 In addition, the Israeli state gave more funding to Druze 
localities than to Christian and Muslim ones. Also, as members of the 
Druze community serve in the Israeli military, they receive some 
benefits, including subsidised housing loans, access to Israeli 
academic institutions, and privileged access to some jobs.  
In this context, it is worth mentioning that while religious Jews 
are by law exempt from military service, they still enjoy preferential 
treatment in education, jobs, loans, and state funding for their 
localities. Thus, the preferential and exclusionary category of military 
service is only used against the Palestinians, Christians and Muslims 
alike. Having said that, one should note that Druze are not treated on 
equal footing with Jews in Israel. Rather, they remain discriminated 
against. While they are generally treated better than the rest of the 
Palestinian community, they fall behind vis-à-vis the Jewish 
community when it comes to access to quality of education, jobs, 
and funding for localities. Druze land was also the subject of land 
confiscation, which is never practiced against Jews. 
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Since the creation of the Israeli state, a military regime was 
imposed on the native Palestinian community. Under this military 
regime, the Palestinian community faced restrictions on movement, 
political organising, and also faced economic and social repression.  
The military regime not only helped segregate them from the Jewish 
citizens of the state, but also from each other, as no person was 
allowed to leave his/her village without a permit, which was not often 
given without pressure to co-operate with the state. The military 
period also witnessed many curfews, especially during the nighttime, 
so as to prevent Palestinians from socialising, visiting each other, or 
holding events and meetings. Over time, the 1948 Palestinians were 
estranged not only from the rest of the Palestinian and Arab 
communities outside the borders controlled by Israel, but even from 
their own land and from each other internally. They became 
ghettoised, familiar only with nearby villages, while the Jewish 
localities that they visited or lived in remained alien to them.11 
Instances of communal conflict and violence among 
Palestinians in Israel must be understood in this context. They 
remain within a supremacist ethnic settler colonial state that favors 
Jews (even those who live worldwide) over them, which works to 
marginalise and fragment them from each other and from the rest of 
the Palestinian and Arab peoples. They lived for more than 20 years 
without any contact with the rest of the Palestinian community in the 
1967 territories disconnected from those who live in exile. They are 
also disconnected from the rest of the Arab culture around them. 
Ongoing repression of their national identity, and of their economic 
and social cohesion and development should also be considered.12 
 
INSTANCES OF COMMUNAL CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE AMONG 
PALESTINIANS 
 
I will now discuss three cases of communal conflict and violence; one 
at length, two others more briefly, in order to illustrate the link 
between Israeli settler colonialism and communal conflict. I will 
discuss these cases of communal violence – two among 1948 
Palestinians, one from the 1967 areas – as a way to examine 
patterns of internal communal conflicts and violence, as well as the 
behavior of state security forces. I will illustrate the way these 
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conflicts erupt, and, more importantly, how the state encourages 
them. I will also outline community responses.13 
 
1. KAFR YASSIF 
 
It happened on the 11 of April 1981, in relation to a football game 
between teams from two adjacent Palestinian villages in Galilee. One 
village was Julis – a Druze village, the other was Kafr Yassif – a 
majority Christian village with Muslim and Druze inhabitants. The 
Israeli police are present at all sport events. The game was decisive 
because it would decide which of the two teams would be promoted 
to the upper division of the Israeli football league. The night before 
the game, the manager of the Kafr Yassif team received a threatening 
phone call that appeared to be from someone in Julis. The caller 
warned of possible violence should the team from Julis not prevail. 
The manager, as result of this phone call, contacted the regional 
police station and the mayor of Kafr Yassif. Both the team manager 
and the mayor called again asking for a police presence that would 
prevent violence from taking place during or after the game. Only 4 
policemen were present at the Kafr Yassif football ground the 
following day.  
As news about threats spread around the village at night and 
the next day, the atmosphere became tense. As Druze serve in the 
Israeli military, they often carry arms, and have used them on several 
occasions, even in the context of internal fighting within the Druze 
community. It is worth nothing that such misuse of arms is not 
allowed within the Jewish community, but it is tolerated within the 
Druze community and no one has been punished for such offenses.  
Halfway through the game, the Kafr Yassif team scored one 
goal. The fans from Julis started to shout and make threats. Some 
individuals from Kafr Yassif, including members of the management 
of the team, asked Kafr Yassif team members during the break to let 
the team from Julis win the game. Julis then won the game by 
scoring two goals. Unappeased, Julis fans attacked Kafr Yassif fans. 
This led to mass fighting. One man from Julis was stabbed, and a 
grenade killed one young person from Kafr Yassif. Several others 
were injured. Although sport related violence is not unprecedented, 
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the use of arms was unusual. While Israeli police were present at the 
game, they did not interfere to prevent or stop the fighting.  
The story did not end here. The mayor and leaders in Kafr 
Yassif complained to the police for not sending enough police force 
as requested. Yet, the head of the police station in the area claimed 
he had not expected violence. Then the mayor and leaders of Kafr 
Yassif also asked the head of the regional police station to send 
reinforcements to the village in order to prevent further escalation, as 
individuals from Julis had threatened further violence. They also 
contacted leaders from the larger Palestinian community in order to 
initiate a Sulha – a local method of conflict management used in 
communities that cannot rely on the Israeli security structure for 
safety, or on its judicial system for justice.14 At the same time, they 
called on members of parliament from the Israeli Communist Party 
(the only party at the time representing the Palestinian community), 
who in turn called on the Israeli Minister of Interior (responsible for 
interior security, and for the police department) asking for more 
police force to be sent to Kafr Yassif.  
In the meantime, the Sulha initiative was making progress in 
securing a Hudna (truce), which is the first step towards conflict 
resolution. Suddenly, and after two days of talking to leaders in Julis, 
the Sulha delegation members called the mayor of Kafr Yassif for a 
meeting (which took place in Kafr Yassif), and informed him that the 
leadership in Julis had changed its opinion, that they were no longer 
observing the truce, and that the Sulha initiative had failed to secure 
a resolution to the conflict. Members of the Sulha committee (which 
is normally composed of community leaders, including heads of 
large families, experts in the conflict management method, 
politicians, and even poets) argued that their initiative failed because 
influential leaders within the Druze community, individuals who had 
strong connections with the Israeli establishment, were advising 
against it. They further asked the mayor and leadership in Kafr Yassif 
to continue making calls to the police and asking for more police to 
be sent to the village. At the same time, they promised to send as 
many people as they could from neighboring villages to help Kafr 
Yassif if further attacks took place. 
Three days after the game, Julis residents attacked Christian 
residents of Kafr Yassif using Israeli military arms, vehicles, 
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equipment. As a result of the attack, two more individuals from Kafr 
Yassif died, over 20 were injured, and scores of houses and property 
were bombed, burned, and or damaged. This attack occurred under 
the eyes of the Israeli police but without any intervention.  More than 
20 policemen were present in the village, but they withdrew in a 
manner that eyewitnesses perceived was coordinated with the 
attackers.  The attackers were allowed to move from one 
neighborhood to the next, shooting and bombing, and using military 
communication equipment. Eyewitnesses recognised an organised 
military operation. Memories of the past came to the fore for many in 
the village: the events of 1948, the Kafr Qassim massacre in 1956, 
and the Land Day of 1976 massacre committed by Israeli forces 
against Palestinians who demonstrated in opposition to land 
confiscations.  
While the police force that was present inside the village acted 
in complicity with the attackers, and while it let the entrance between 
the two villages open, which allowed the attackers to enter Kafr 
Yassif, police detachments were present at the other two entrances 
of the village, preventing aid from coming from neighboring villages. 
The official Israeli narrative is contradictory: while it argues that ‘the 
police did not expect violence to erupt’, it also reports that ‘violence 
is part of Arab society and culture’ (suddenly, Druze are talked about 
as part of the Palestinian Arab community and culture – they are no 
longer separate religious and ethnic group with ancient ties to Jews).  
Furthermore, while the police were unable to prevent the 
attack, they were able to prevent the hundreds from neighboring 
villages who tried to enter the village to help the residents of Kafr 
Yassif. While the police were unable to block the narrow entrance 
road between Julis to Kafr Yassif, through which the attackers 
entered the village, they were able to block the other two wider 
entrances of the village, from which those who came from 
neighboring villages to help were trying to enter Kafr Yassif. 
Soon after the attack, the local council in Kafr Yassif 
demanded an independent investigation to look into police actions, 
but the Israeli government refused to respond. Instead, it appointed 
its own investigation committee that absolved the Israeli government 
and the security forces from any responsibility. It only 
recommended: ‘such incidents should be taken more seriously in the 
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future by the police’. Of course, this would not happen as we will see 
in the other cases I discuss here. Not one official was held 
responsible. It is also significant that the investigation committee 
only talked to Israeli security officials and ignored eyewitnesses who 
might have contested the narrative provided to them by the police.  
After the report was issued, the local council in Kafr Yassif 
intensified its activism within the Arab community, the Israeli public, 
and even internationally in an attempt to allow for an independent 
investigation. Instead, the Israeli government forced the leaders in 
Kafr Yassif to accept a Sulha framework different from the one 
initiated earlier by the community itself. The Sulha agreement 
initiated by the government and its men in the region was 
accompanied by threats of more violence. While normally Sulha 
procedures require the naming of those who are responsible for the 
violence, they need to formally apologise, the Sulha imposed on Kafr 
Yassif ended without naming those who were responsible. On the 
contrary, it hinted at the responsibility of Kafr Yassif and its mayor, 
and some unnamed ‘irresponsible individuals’. 
Here, the party accused (the Israeli government being 
responsible for the interior ministry and police) became the judge of 
its own actions. Unsurprisingly, it did not charge any Israeli official, 
and accused the victims for responsibility over an attack that took 
place against them. This pattern of Israeli official investigations of 
crimes committed against Palestinians and Arabs and against any 
group acting in solidarity with them continues to this day. Almost all 
investigations end with Israel taking hardly any responsibility, and 
often blaming the victims, as outlined by Edward Said.15 Even worse, 
Israeli officials who are accused of responsibility for crimes against 
the Palestinian community are often promoted in their military and 
political careers, as Emile Habibi writes.16 
To see whether the Kafr Yassif case was an exception or part of 
a pattern of Israeli policies, I will now briefly discuss two cases 
involving inter-communal violence in the Palestinian community; one 
from another village in Galilee, and another from a village in the West 
Bank near Ramallah. 
 
2. AL-MAGHAR 
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Fighting took place in 2005 between Druze and Christian 
communities in the village of Al-Maghar in Galilee. Resulting from a 
conflict between two families, one Christian and one Druze, an attack 
on shops and homes belonging to members in the Christian 
community took place for a full day, and was renewed again the next 
day. While eyewitnesses indicated that the Israeli police was present 
in most places where the violence occurred, members of the police 
force at times even participated in the attacks. Much damage to 
property and injuries resulted from this incident; and shock and fear 
led many members of the Christian community to flee the village 
until a Sulha secured their return.  
 
3. DEIT JARIR 
 
Another case of inter-communal violence took place in the West Bank 
in 2006. It happened in Deit Jarir, a village near Ramallah, but 
located between area A (territory that is ‘controlled’ by the 
Palestinian Authority) and area C (territory controlled by Israel). In 
that instance, it was a conflict between a Christian and Muslim family 
that escalated. Leaders from Deit Jarir called on the Palestinian 
Authority to intervene. The Palestinian Authority immediately sent a 
security detachment to Deit Jarir, but was unable to reach the village 
because the Israeli military prevented it from going further. It took 
calls from the American Embassy in Jerusalem to allow this force to 
enter the village and stop attacks against property. While no one was 
injured or killed, the attack produced extensive damage. 
 
SETTLER COLONIALISM, POLICE STATE, RESISTANCE 
 
Immediately after its inception as a settler colonial state, Israel 
pursued different policies to repress, marginalise, and demobilise the 
Palestinian community. At first it created a military regime that 
officially lasted until 1966. During the period of the military regime, 
areas where Palestinians were concentrated were declared military 
zones and filled with military checkpoints. Restrictions on movement 
were paralleled by repression of any political organising. 
Furthermore, land confiscation was expedited. While confiscating 
lands from native Palestinians, the state was building Jewish 
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settlements in areas that limited the expansion of the Palestinian 
residential areas and destroyed the Palestinian farming sector. This 
same pattern took place later in the areas colonised by Israel in 
1967. Land confiscation and house demolitions are still practiced 
against the native Palestinian citizens in the 1948 areas. 
In addition to the policies of economic, social, and political 
repression, the Israeli-imposed and controlled educational system 
has been working to suppress Palestinian national history and 
identity while promoting a Zionist version of history that emphasises 
a very positive image of Judaism, its history, and Zionism and sought 
loyalty to the state. Although the military regime ended officially in 
1966, hundreds of emergency regulations are still intact to this day. 
They severely constrain the political, economic and social 
empowerment of the Palestinian community.17 
Of course, these policies did not go without resistance. 
Contrary to narratives emphasising acquiescence and co-optation, 
Ahmad Sa’di focuses on coalition building and resistance.18 
Resistance started immediately after 1948 and continues to this day. 
Interestingly, Ahmad Sa’di uses the case of Kafr Yassif to illustrate 
his argument.19 From Ahmad Sa’di’s study, as well as my archival 
work in Kafr Yassif, I found that from early on, a coalition was 
established between nationalists and communists in Kafr Yassif 
challenging attacks on the local council headed by Yanni Yanni, a 
well-known nationalist leader (of Greek origin). The residents of the 
village also challenged state policies of land confiscation, and, as 
importantly, the attempt by the local Israeli military governor to 
deport Palestinian refugees from neighbouring destroyed villages 
that had arrived in Kafr Yassif for refuge and protection. The struggle 
against these policies in the village led to publications in Al-Ittihad 
(the Communist Party Arabic newspaper), especially a well-known 
article by Emile Habibi calling on all Arabs to follow the example of 
Kafr Yassif. The news of the village reached Europe, and led to a visit 
by Simone De Beauvoir and Jean Paul Sartre. 
Even the policy of ethnicising the Druze community, the draft 
into the Israeli military, and the attempt to completely disconnect it 
from the rest of the Palestinian community was not unchallenged. 
From the beginning, resistance to that policy came from within the 
community itself. Opposition against the military draft started early 
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on, and a formal association against the military draft was 
established in the 1970s and is still active to this day. Members of 
the Druze community continue to be involved in Palestinian political 
organising. Druze opposition to state policies was not only due to a 
sense of belonging to the larger Palestinian and Arab peoples, 
however. Discrimination and land confiscation were also important.20 
In other words, while the Israeli settler colonial state has been 
pursuing, since its inception, different policies aiming to marginalise, 
fragment, repress, and dispossess the native Palestinian community, 
and while these policies have taken several forms, from officially 
declared ones, to non-officially implemented others, from direct 
physical violence, to non-physical violence against the community’s 
identity and well-being, the community has not been passive. The 
native Palestinian community has been challenging the violence of 
the state and its policies through continuous political organising and 
protests, coalition building, maintaining and developing its national 
identity, language and historical memory, and constantly connecting 
to the rest of the Palestinian community in the 1967 areas as well as 
in the diaspora. They have done this through poetry and other forms 
of artistic expression, through different official and non-official 
projects, and through direct as well as virtual means of 
communication. As Nadim Rouhana argues, among others, they 
remain alienated from the Israeli state.21 Even the symbolic violence 
inherent in attempts to change the names of towns, villages, and 
other geographic locations is challenged by the community’s 
resilience and memory of the original Arabic names. The dialectic 
between repression, erasure, denial, and memory continues to this 
day. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
While my paper focused on communal identity, conflict and violence, 
there are other forms of conflicts and violence taking place within the 
native Palestinian community in Israel. Violence occurs within the 
same family, within families from the same religious community, 
between individuals and groups belonging to different political 
parties (especially around election campaigns), and in between 
gangs. In some instances, guns are used. These events are always 
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reported in the Arab media, as well as in the Israeli Hebrew media. 
Community leaders and political leaders in the Palestinian 
community continue to call upon the state to initiate policies that 
would address this problem. To this day, the Israeli state continues 
to ignore these calls. Israeli security forces seem to only focus on the 
Palestinian community through the perspective of a security lens, 
always monitoring what they call the ‘radicalisation’ of the 
Palestinian public.  Israeli security forces only intervene forcefully to 
suppress political organising and protests. 
From the cases discussed here, it appears that the Israeli state 
encourages internal divisions, continues to repress the Palestinian 
collective identity, and lets conflicts erupt into violence. On the other 
hand, some in the Palestinian community are dealing with this 
problem through continuing calls on the state to maintain internal 
peace and order. At the same time, local conflict management 
methods are also used to manage tensions. Many political parties 
and organisations also work on education and mobilisation for unity. 
This paper argued that linking the historical development of 
1948 and that of 1967 Palestinians is not only about countering the 
rupture that took place in 1948, but could also illustrate the 
intentions of the Israeli establishment, and possible scenarios for the 
future. In other words, learning about 1948 Palestinians can tell us 
more about the history of that community, as well as highlighting the 
pattern of relationships the state has established with the 1967 
Palestinians.  
Failing to focus on the origins of the state, and on relations 
between settlers and natives, has led to a flawed understanding of 
the Israeli state and its relations to native Palestinians in the field of 
Palestine Studies. By not grounding the analyses on the origin of the 
state (at least since 1948), much scholarly work ends up missing the 
impact of settler colonial structures and their ramification for the 
Palestinians who are citizens of the state and those who reside in the 
1967 Territories. In some sense, this work even legitimates the 
settler colonial structure established in 1948. By not connecting the 
scholarship about 1948 and that of 1967 Palestinians, we fail to 
recognise a pattern that started in 1948 and was replicated in 1967. 
By studying 1948 Palestinians, we can better understand the 
intentions of the Israeli state for the future of the Palestinians living 
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in the 1967 areas, as well as those in exile. A state that was 
established as a setter colonial structure on the ruins of the native 
population, cannot allow for coexistence unless it dismantles a 
founding ideology and goes through an historical self-evaluation. This 
must include the acknowledgement of past wrongs and a 
commitment to reparation. 
Settler colonialism, as many theorists have argued, is based 
on a genocidal attempt to displace indigenous peoples.22 This 
produces endlessly conflicting relations with the native population, 
and can help explaining Israeli policies and positions towards the 
1948 Palestinians, and all Palestinians in general. Furthermore, my 
work attempts, at least in part, to add to this field by linking the 
studies of settler colonialism with communal and group conflicts and 
violence. If the Israeli policy has been to divide and disperse, the 
Palestinian people, in response must be to unite and converge. 
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